 roponents of market liberalism claim the
free market is the essential foundation of political democracy a guarantor
of the rights of people against the abuse of state power. They neglect,
however, the important ways in which the unfettered market tends to function
as a profoundly undemocratic institution.
 Political democracy vests rights
in the living person one person, one vote. By contrast, the market recognizes
only money, not people one dollar, one vote. It gives no voice to the penniless
and, when not balanced by constraining political forces, can become an instrument
of oppression by which the wealthy monopolize society's resources, leaving
the less fortunate without land, jobs, technology or other means of livelihood.
Only when wealth is equally distributed can the market be considered democratic
in any meaningful sense.
Global markets are now dominated
by global mega-corporations among the most undemocratic and unaccountable
of human institutions. By its nature the corporation creates a legal concentration
of power while shielding those who wield that power from accountability
for the consequences of its use. Many mega-corporations command more economic
power than do the majority of states and dominate the political processes
of nearly all states. Their growing unaccountable power poses a serious
threat to the basic economic and political rights of people everywhere.
The time has come to reexamine some
of our most basic assumptions about the nature of democracy, human rights,
and the institution of the corporation. The survival of our political freedoms
depends on recognizing that economic rights are an essential foundation
of political democracy.
Consider, for example, two of the
most fundamental of all human rights the right to a means of living literally
the right to live and the right to participate in making the decisions that
affect our lives.
The earth's life-sustaining resources
are a common heritage of all life. All people are born with an inalienable
right to a sufficient share of these resources to create a secure and fulfilling
life for themselves and their families. They have a corresponding responsibility
to share and steward these resources to the benefit of all persons and other
living things.
Since the most basic requirements
of living depend on the products of the earth, there is a fundamental though
often neglected connection between livelihood rights and property rights.
English philosopher John Locke set forth a moral justification for property
rights in The Second Treatise of Government, published in 1689. Locke argued
that where unused land is abundant, a man has a right to appropriate for
his private and exclusive use the land which he tills to produce for his
basic subsistence needs. It is through the application of his labor to make
the land produce that he acquires this private right. Locke stressed that,
given the condition of abundance, such appropriation in no way deprived
others of similar opportunity. Locke was also clear that the rightful claim
to a property right followed only from the application of one's personal
labor. Furthermore, he said, this claim legitimately extended only to such
property as was required to meet one's own material needs suggesting that
a property right is virtually synonymous with a livelihood right.
Locke, however, went beyond this
relatively unassailable moral argument to seek justification for actions
of those who accumulate property rights far beyond their personal needs.
Presuming that property rights are most likely to be accumulated by clever
and industrious persons who seek to realize their full productive potential,
Locke argued that the result of this accumulation would be to maximize the
wealth of society and thereby the well-being of all. It is essentially the
same argument that economists make to this day in defense of inequality,
based on the assumption that the surpluses created through investments of
the wealthy in a growing economy will be widely distributed through society
in the form of high-paying jobs and well-funded public services.
It is noteworthy that the moral defense
of inequality imbedded in Locke's thesis and the work of most modern economists
rests on two inadequately examined assumptions: (1) natural wealth is abundant
relative to need; and (2) the benefits of an overall increase in economic
activity are widely shared even when wealth is distributed unequally. Unfortunately,
for several billion people who find their livelihoods increasingly at risk,
neither premise is valid in our present world. To the contrary, the poor
are being excluded from access to land, technology is eliminating jobs faster
than it is creating new ones, and public services are being systematically
dismantled all to increase the riches of those whose wealth already exceeds
any conceivable need. In short, property rights are being used routinely
to justify the exclusion of those without property from access to a decent
means of living.
As suggested by Locke's argument,
the rightful purpose of a property right is to protect a person's right
of access to a means of livelihood or to secure for the individual a just
reward for entrepreneurial initiatives that create a better life for all.
A property right loses its legitimacy when its exercise by those who have
more than they need denies others of their rightful means of livelihood
or otherwise diminishes their opportunities for a full and meaningful life.
The livelihood rights of the many come before the property rights of the
few. Recognition in our laws and public culture of this limitation of property
rights is fundamental to the market's socially efficient function. | 
